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ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL ALLOCATION OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE VOTES*
Christopher Duquette*& David Schultz::
I. Introduction
The Electoral College is an American political and
constitutional curiosity. The constitutional framers
believed it would produce "extraordinary persons" as
presidents because they would be selected by "men most
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station" of
the presidency.' Its more recent defenders, such as Martin
Diamond, have justified it as either a constitutional system
meant to protect individual and minority rights or a
mechanism to overcome regionalism. 2 In Diamond's view,
along with the principles of separation of powers and
checks and balances, it was necessary to thwart the dangers
of factionalism that a popular government posed.3  Some
have noted that, with an Electoral College, national
recounts are unnecessary, as only the votes cast in disputed
jurisdictions would need to be recounted.4
* The authors acknowledge Rick -Hasen of Loyola Law School (Los
Angeles) for his thoughtful comments on this article, as well as Hester
Peirce from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission for
her editorial suggestions.
+ Research Staff, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia.
* Professor, Graduate School of Management and Department of
Criminal Justice and Forensic Science, Hamline University, and School
of Law, University of Minnesota.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 444 (James Madison) (Modem Library
1937).
2 Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration
of the Framers'Intent, 53 AMER. POL. SCI. R. 52 (1959).
3 id.
4 RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 224-27 (2001). See
1
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Yet, the Electoral College also has its detractors. It
has been criticized as undemocratic, as denying individual
liberty and the fundamental right to vote, and as no longer
serving the purpose for which it was established.
5
Following the 2000 presidential election-where George
Bush lost the national popular vote to Al Gore but won the
Electoral College vote-those criticisms intensified.6
The 2000 election was not the first to showcase
these peculiar aspects of the Electoral College. In 1800, for
example, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr deadlocked
with equal numbers of electoral votes.7 The House of
Representatives decided the election in favor of Jefferson.
8
In 1824, Andrew Jackson received the plurality of popular
and electoral votes, yet lost to John Quincy Adams in the
House of Representatives. 9 In 1876, Samuel J. Tilden
also Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 396 (2001)
(examining the various issues surrounding the administration of
presidential elections, including state recounts).
See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES:
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1992).
6 See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE
SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR
PRESIDENT (2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How
THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); ABNER GREENE,
UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 22-26 (2001) (reviewing
criticisms of the Electoral College); DOUGLAS KELLNER, GRAND THEFT
2000: MEDIA SPECTACLE AND A STOLEN ELECTION (2001); POSNER,
supra note 4, at 224-27 (reviewing criticisms of the Electoral College);
Jack N. Rakove, The E-College in the E-Age, in THE UNFINISHED
ELECTION OF 2000 201, 221-27 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
7 Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were running as a team. At the
time, each elector could cast two votes. The candidate receiving the
most votes was elected president, and the number-two vote recipient
was elected vice president.
8 DUMAS MALONE & BASIL RAUCH, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY: THE
GENESIS AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 323-327
(1960).
9 Id. at 430-32.
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received more of the popular vote than did Rutherford B.
Hayes, but disputes in Florida regarding who to recognize
as electors resulted in a compromise that awarded the
presidency to Hayes.' 0 Again, in 1888, Grover Cleveland
received more popular votes than Benjamin Harrison, but
Harrison became President with a majority of the electoral
vote." For some, these elections reveal the undemocratic
character of the Electoral College. 12
Others maintain that the Electoral College deRresses
voter turnout' or creates a system of wasted votes. 14 Still
others see the Electoral College as discouraging the
formation and support of third parties. 15 Ralph Nader and
Green Party backers articulated this criticism in recent
presidential races. 16  A further criticism of the Electoral
College arises from the practice of all states-except for
Maine and Nebraska-to award all of their electoral votes
to the presidential candidate receiving the plurality of the
10 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B.
Morris, eds., 1988); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE
DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 (2004).
11 GREENE, supra note 6, at 22 (for a review of the historical problems
with the Electoral College).
12 For a review of these claims, see generally GREENE, supra note 6;
POSNER, supra note 4.
13 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote and Election 2000, in THE
UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 75, 96 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
14 An example cited is a situation where an overwhelming majority of
the population in a state has one preference, causing some in the
minority in that state to abstain from voting. See GEORGE C.
EDWARDS, III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA
(2004) (arguing that the Electoral College serves to disenfranchise
many voters not living in competitive states).
15 Thomas M. Durbin, The Anachronistic Electoral College: The Time
For Reform, 39 FED B. N.J. 510 (1992).
16 Nader Brushes Off Spoiler Role, Lubbockonline (November 15,
2000), available at
http://quest.lubbockonline.com/stories/lll500/nad_1115006860.shtml
(last visited on September 7, 2006).
3
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popular vote in their states.' 
7
In light of the history and criticism levied against
the Electoral College, it is worth asking whether awarding
electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis is unfair or, more
importantly, unconstitutional. In the 1966 case Delaware
v. New York, the Supreme Court refused to hear an original
jurisdiction case that would have argued that question. 18 In
particular, the Court was asked to decide whether the state
winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes
violated the "one person, one vote" standard that had been
articulated in Reynolds v. Sims. 19 Without comment, the
Court declined review, leaving in doubt how to interpret the
unexplained denial.2°
Since 1966, two conditions have changed,
suggesting that the constitutionality or fairness of the
winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes should
be revisited. First, in 1966, the reapportionment and "one
person, one vote" jurisprudence was in its infancy. Four
decades later, it is more constitutionally developed in terms
of its application and scope. 21 Second, under the winner-
take-all method, the occurrence of a scenario similar to
what happened in Florida in 2000 was likely. That scenario
very nearly happened in the 1960 election, when Texas and
17 GREENE, supra note 6, at 25; POSNER, supra note 4, at 231, 239;
GERALD M. POMPER, The Presidential Election, in THE ELECTION OF
2000 125, 150 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 2001). During the 2004
presidential election, voters in Colorado rejected a state ballot measure
to amend the state constitution to award that state's electoral votes
proportional to the popular-vote vote breakdown. See Colorado
Secretary of State, Colorado Amendment 36: Selection of Presidential
Electors, available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/tb-
final99.htm (last visited July 10, 2006).
18 Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
'9 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20 385 U.S. at 895, reh 'g denied.
21 Specifically, by the time Delaware v. New York was filed, it was not
clear how far the one person, one vote jurisprudence would be legally
applied.
4
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Illinois represented the margin of John F. Kennedy's
victory over Richard M. Nixon, amid serious allegations of
irregularities in both states.22 When these allegations
arose, they brought the inequities in the operation of the
Electoral College to the forefront.
This article will present a new method of assessing
the inequities of the winner-take-all method states use to
allocate electoral votes, and will show that such a system
produces significant inequities in the voting power of
citizens across states. 23 In so doing, the article makes two
claims. First, states do have broad power to choose
electors, but that power must be read in light of the current
voting rights and reapportionment jurisprudence. Second,
the "one person, one vote" standard for reapportionment
calls into question the fairness, if not the constitutionality,
of the winner-take-all approach for awarding presidential
electors.
In effect, this article argues for the repeal of winner-
take-all methods for selecting electoral votes. It contends
that if the Court were to hear a case like Delaware v. New
York today, notwithstanding what Article II of the
Constitution says, a candidate or state could make a case
that the winner-take-all method of awarding presidential
electors is unconstitutional.24 In the alternative, this article
22 THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1960, 350-65
(Atheneum 1961).
23 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 396 ("The need for uniformity itself is
echoed in the Constitution, which requires a uniform day for choosing
presidential electors. On the other hand, each state picks its own
electors for the Electoral College, so equality in the weighting of votes
across states is affirmatively rejected in the Constitution.").
24 Whether the Court would entertain and accept the argument is a
matter of debate. Even if it did not, one can still argue that the
inequities in voter strength across states created by the winner-take-all
method contribute to the existing criticisms of the Electoral College,
and thereby add more fuel to why states should abandon this
presidential election selection system in the interest of protecting the
voting rights of their citizens.
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advocates that states abandon winner-take-all systems on
their own in the interest of fairness and enhancing, in many
cases, the influence that their citizens have in the selection
of the president.
To make these claims, this article briefly discusses
the constitutional power that states have to select their
presidential electors. 25 This article then provides a brief
discussion of the right to vote in the context of
reapportionment, especially as it is relevant to the Electoral
College and presidential selection.26 Next, it provides a
new way to assess the relative weighting of electoral votes,
making the case that the winner-take-all allocation of
electoral votes leads to distortions. 27 Finally, the article
argues that those distortions violate the "one person, one
vote" constitutional standard.28
Overall, this article contends that even if the
Supreme Court is unwilling to address the constitutionality
of the winner-take-all method, as a matter of law or public
policy, states might wish to consider eliminating this
method of allocating electoral votes. While the winner-
take-all method can have the effect of boosting the
influence of some states' citizens in presidential elections,
it does so by marginalizing the influence of voters from
other states.
II. State Power and the Electoral College
From the text of the Constitution, state legislatures
appear to have plenary power to determine the selection of
their presidential electors. Article II, Sections 2 through 5
of the Constitution, read in conjunction with the Twelfth
Amendment, describe the process for the selection of the
President. According to Article II, "Each State shall
25 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Part IV.
28See infra Part V.
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appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress." 29 Indeed, in the only two cases
where the Supreme Court has adjudicated Article II,
Section 2, the Justices have given states broad authority to
determine how electors are selected.3 °
In McPherson v. Blacker, 31 the State of Michigan
enacted a law changing the selection of its electors. The
Secretary of State challenged this law as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting this challenge, the
Court interpreted the Constitution as giving state
legislatures "plenary authority to direct the manner of
appointment" of its electors. 32  According to the Court,
Michigan was free to determine how its electors would be
chosen, subject to the limitations of its state constitution. 33
Bush v. Gore34 is the only other case in which the
Court has directly addressed the state power over the
selection of electors. In this case, the Court considered
whether the manner of counting the ballots in the disputed
Florida 2000 presidential election violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35  In
ruling that it did, the Court built upon its voting rights and
reapportionment jurisprudence, indicating that the right to
vote was "protected in more than the initial allocation of
the franchise." 36 Specifically, the Court extended the right-
to-vote protection to the counting of ballots. The Court
limited this holding, however, by noting that while the
29 U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 2.
30 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
31 146 U.S. at 1.
32 Id. at 25.
33 id.
14531 U.S. at 98.
35 Id. at 105.
36 Id. at 104.
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Constitution does not grant individuals the right to vote in
presidential elections, states do.37 More importantly, the
Court, quoting McPherson, reiterated that the State's power
to determine the selection of their electors is plenary.
3 8
In addition to the per curiam opinion in Bush v.
Gore, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, also discusses the authority of states to conduct
presidential elections and select electors.3 9  The Chief
Justice first noted how the text of the Constitution imposes
upon states a duty to select its electors. 40 In imposing that
duty, Rehnquist cited McPherson for the proposition that
the Constitution "convey[s] the broadest power of
determination and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to
define the method of appointment."4  Thus, as with the per
curiam opinion, the Chief Justice seems to suggest that
state legislatures have broad discretion to select their
electors and conduct presidential elections. In fact, as part
of this deference, Congress enacted Title 3 U.S.C. § 5 to
present state legislatures with a "safe harbor" for their
determination of how electors are to be selected, if disputes
over them are challenged in Congress. 4 2 This safe harbor
provision, along with the text of the Constitution,
necessitated that the Court review "postelection state-court
actions" by the Florida Supreme Court to be sure that these
judicial proceedings did not trample upon the power of the
State Legislature to determine the manner of selection for
its electors.43 In effect, the power of legislatures to pick
their electors is so plenary that it might alter or affect the
normal separation of powers within a state such that their
37 id.
38 i.
39 Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J. and Thomas, J. concurring).
4° d. at 112.
41 Id. at 113 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27) (internal quotation
marks omitted).421d. at 113-14.
43 1d. at 114.
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courts might not be able to second guess how they
determine presidential selection."
Notwithstanding Article II, Section 2, McPherson,
and Bush, the near plenary power of states to award their
electoral votes does not mean that states can otherwise
violate the Constitution. For example, could a state decide
to let only women or whites vote in presidential elections or
serve as electors? Discriminatory practices that use race or
gender as a factor have been declared unconstitutional in
many circumstances. 45 The use of race in reapportionment
has also been found to violate the Constitution.
46
Legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act, 47 has declared
discrimination in voting based on race illegal. Overall, the
argument that the plenary power of states to allocate
electoral votes must be qualified; such power cannot be
exercised in violation of other constitutional and statutory
limits.
48
The Supreme Court has also noted the uniqueness
of the presidential selection process and has been willing to
address how states conduct presidential elections. For
example, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,49 the Supreme Court
441d. at 112-13.
45 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars the intentional use of race by
governments); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (ruling by
a four person plurality that classifications on the basis of gender are
suspect); Gormillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that
the use of race in districting violates the Fifteenth Amendment);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding
classifications on the basis of race are suspect).
46 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 620 (1993); Gormillion, 364 U.S. at 339.
See also infra Part III.47 See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
48 See generally Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush
v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential
Electors, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 535, 536 (2001) (arguing the Constitution
should be interpreted to place some limits on the ability of states to
deny citizens the right to select presidential electors).
49 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
9
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was willing to place limits on how states determine ballot
access for presidential candidates. In Burroughs v. United
States,5 ° the Court considered whether the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act applied to political committees seeking to
influence the selection of presidential electors. Ruling that
it did, the Court argued that, even though the power to
select electors resided with the states, Congress has the
authority to pass legislation to ensure that money does not
corrupt the electoral process.51
In Moore v. Ogilvie,52 the Court held that the "one
person, one vote" principle applied to petition gathering for
the selection of presidential electors. At issue was an
Illinois law regulating petition signatures for new parties,
as it was applied to "independent candidates for the offices
of electors of President and Vice President of the United
States from Illinois." 53  The law, which mandated a
geographic dispersion for signers, was held to violate the
"one person, one vote" standard because of the burden it
created by mandating that signatures be obtained in at least
fifty counties.54 The Court noted that, because of the way
the population was distributed in the state, residents in
some counties would have an easier time securing
signatures than in others. 55  If "one person, one vote"
applies to petition gathering for electors, would it not also
apply to how the electors are allocated?
Anderson, Burroughs, and Moore all demonstrate
that the power of states to select their electors is not
absolute. That power is subject to qualifications. While
the Court in Bush v. Gore declared that individuals have no
right to vote in presidential elections unless the states grant
'0 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
" Id. at 545.
52 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969).
531 d. at 815.
54 id.
5 Id at 819.
10
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such a power, 56 the Court stipulated in Moore that: "All
procedures used by a State as an integral part of the
election process must pass muster against the charges of
discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote. 57
This prophylactic against discrimination must apply, as the
Court stated in Bush v. Gore-when it extended the "one
person, one vote" standard of Reynolds to presidential vote
counting-to "more than the initial allocation of the
franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner
of its exercise." 58 Thus, in cases where states have granted
individuals the right to vote in presidential elections, that
right mandates that they not arbitrarily interfere with
awarding that right or in counting the presidential ballots.
Il. Voting Rights, Representation, and
Reapportionment
The Bush v. Gore holding that the Constitution does
not guarantee the right to vote in presidential elections
cannot be applied in isolation. The Court has also held that
voting is a fundamental right protected under the
Constitution, 59  especially in the context of
reapportionment. 
60
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates
that the federal government take a federal census every ten
years for the purpose of apportioning representation in the
House of Representatives. 6  The decennial census forms
the basis for the reallocation of House members among the
states based on population changes. Nothing in the plain
text of the Constitution, however, requires states to draw
House districts of equal population size or to redraw
56 531 U.S. at 104.
7 394 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted).
58531 U.S. at 104.
59 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
60 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
11
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districts to reflect changes in population.
Therefore, elected officials often seek to manipulate
the apportionment process to their benefit by drawing lines
that will favor their re-election efforts. During the
nineteenth century, the majority of the nation's population
lived in rural areas, thereby giving those areas significant
political representation both in Congress and the state
legislatures. 62 By the early to mid-twentieth century, the
population centers had shifted to the cities. 63  Yet state
legislatures, still controlled by rural interests, refused to
reapportion and redistrict, for doing so would diminish the
power of the rural areas. 64  In addition, many states,
particularly in the South, were reluctant to redistrict
because urban areas were more heavily populated by
Blacks.65  Thus, efforts to forestall reapportionment
sometimes had a racial motive.
66
In 1946, after efforts to challenge the
malapportionment at the legislative level failed, the
Supreme Court reviewed whether the numerical inequality
in the apportionment of Illinois congressional districts was
constitutional.67 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter
stated that apportionment issues were nonjusticiable
political questions best handled by the legislatures and not
the courts. 6 8 Redistricting was a "political thicket" that the
courts would do well to avoid. 69
In 1962, however, the Supreme Court reversed
itself. In Baker v. Carr,70 the Court rejected the Colegrove
62 DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND




66 Id. See also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 339.
67 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
68 Id. at 554-55.
69 Id. at 556.
70 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12
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holding that reapportionment issues are political questions.
Instead, the Court held that issues alleging
malapportionment raise important constitutional questions
that are within the purview of the judiciary. A few years
earlier, the Court used the Fifteenth Amendment to strike
down a districting scheme in Alabama meant to dilute
African-American representation.7 1  Race was not a
permissible factor for the legislature to consider in
reapportionment.72
After Baker, the Supreme Court ruled on numerous
reapportionment issues. In Reynolds v. Sims,73 it held that
the right to vote was diluted if some districts were more
populous than others and that state legislative seats must be
drawn according to a "one person, one vote" standard. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated, "Legislators
represented people, not trees or acres."
' 7 4
The Court has since extended the "one person, one
vote" standard to other reapportionment contexts. For
example, in Westberry v. Sanders,75 the Court mandated
that congressional districts must be apportioned in a
manner that achieves numerical equality. In Avery v.
Midland County,76 the Court applied the "one person, one
vote" principle to local government units. Moreover, in
Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado,77 the Court
rejected state analogies to the United States Congress
where the Senate was apportioned by geography and the
House by population. The Lucas Court mandated that all
legislative seats must respect the "one person, one vote"
standard.78 In more recent cases, such as Karcher v.
71 Gormillion, 364 U.S. 339.
72 id.
7' 377 U.S. at 533.
74 Id. at 562.
7' 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
76 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
77 377 U.S. 713 (1964).71 Id. at 738-39.
13
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Daggett79 and Brown v. Thomson,80 the Court demanded
strict numerical equality for congressional districts while
permitting a deviation of approximately five percent from
equality at the state level to accommodate local
governments and avert the breakup of political subunits.
The Reynolds v. Sims8 1 line of cases establishes that
within the context of voting rights and reapportionment, the
"one person, one vote" standard is essential to the
protection of franchise and that the unequal weighing of
votes is unconstitutional. However, in Delaware v. New
82York, the Supreme Court declined to consider the
substantive merit of whether the "one person, one vote"
standard applied to the Electoral College. Is there reason to
think that the Court erred in not accepting the case and
reviewing the question on its merits? Might the winner-
take-all allocation of states' Electoral College votes violate
the "one person, one vote" standard?
IV. A Statistical Analysis of the Inequities That
Follow From Winner-Take-All
The events of the presidential election of 2000 left
many uneasy with the Electoral College. In that election,
the margin of victory for Republican George W. Bush over
Democrat Albert Gore was a mere 537 popular votes in
Florida. 83 Those votes-out of nearly six million cast in
the state-swung the State's twenty-five Electoral College
votes 84 to Bush, who ultimately defeated Gore by a mere
79 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
'o 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
81 377 U.S. at 533.
82 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
83 ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO
THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001).
84 In 2000, Florida cast twenty-five Electoral College votes. By the
2004 presidential election, Florida was allotted twenty-seven Electoral
College votes.
14
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 467
four votes (271-267) in the Electoral College. 85 For five
weeks after the polls closed, the election's outcome
remained in doubt as the Bush and Gore camps battled in
the courts over the disputed Florida electors. 86 It took the
intervention of the United States Supreme Court to settle
the battle and determine the outcome of the election in
Florida, and thus, the nation. 87
While the exceedingly narrow margin in Florida in
2000 was atypical, the phenomenon of some states' small
margins of victory disproportionately influencing an
election's outcome was not. The winner-take-all allocation
of each state's Electoral College votes ensures that it will
happen in every election. Under winner-take-all, some
states' votes will count for more than others in determining
the outcome. This effect happens whether the election is a
cliffhanger or a landslide. All that changes from one
election to the next is the magnitude of its effect.
As noted earlier, the operation of the Electoral
College in electing the President is provided for in Article
II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. Each state's
Electoral College vote allotment is equal to the size of its
congressional delegation. The total number of electors is
equal to the total number of members of the Congress, plus
two "shadow" Senators and one "shadow" Representative
for the District of Columbia. At present, the United States
Senate is comprised of 100 members and the United States
House of Representatives is comprised of 435 members.
Adding the three "shadow" D.C. electors gives the
Electoral College its present total of 538 electors. 88 The
8 5 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
2000 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2001). The final margin when the
Electoral College convened was 271-266, as one of Gore's electors
refrained from voting for Gore.
86 See generally GREENE, supra note 83.
87 531 U.S. at 1046.
88 The District of Columbia is allotted three Electoral College votes to
compensate for its lack of a congressional delegation.
15
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 468
Electoral College convenes in December following a
November presidential election, where a majority of the
electors is required to elect a President.89 Therefore, for an
Electoral College of 538 electors, 270 electors is the
minimum number required to win the presidency. In the
absence of a majority, the election is determined by the
House of Representatives, with each state's delegation
counting as one vote.
90
Others have noted how the Electoral College
disproportionately weighs the votes of smaller states
relative to larger states.9 1 This disproportionate weighting
occurs because each state's Electoral College votes are
equal to the sum of its votes in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The House votes are
apportioned on the basis of population, with each state
guaranteed at least one representative, regardless of
population. But the Senate votes are not; each state
receives two Senate votes, regardless of its population. For
example, California, which has 35 million residents,
receives the same number of Senate votes as Wyoming,
which has only 380,000 residents. As a result of the "plus-
two" Senate bonus, smaller states pack a slightly larger
Electoral College punch relative to their populations than
do larger states.
More significant, though, is the effect of the winner-
take-all allocation of each state's Electoral College votes.
At present, in all but two states, Maine and Nebraska, the
Electoral College votes are allocated to each state's
popular-vote winner. Such a winner-take-all allocation is
not mandated by the United States Constitution. Rather,
89 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (detailing the presidential selection
process in the House of Representatives should no candidate receive a
majority of the electoral votes).
91 See, e.g., John F. Banzhaf, III, One Man:3.312 Votes: A
Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 303
(1968).
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the Constitution provides that each state's electors shall be
appointed in a manner to be determined by its legislature.
92
The only stipulation is that a sitting member of Congress
cannot also serve as an elector. 93
Because the Constitution allows state legislatures to
determine how electors are appointed, it is not surprising
that all of the states-with the exception of Maine and
Nebraska-have opted for a winner-take-all allocation. At
the state level, such a course of action is a rational one.
Allocating electors on a winner-take-all basis boosts the
likelihood that candidates will visit a state and pay attention
to its concerns. For example, if Oregon, with its relatively
small population, is shaping up as a swing state, a last-
minute trip to the state might appear attractive to a
candidate. If the trip went well, it could have the effect of
swinging the full complement of the state's Electoral
College votes come Election Day. Candidates would be
less likely to court the state's voters if the state's Electoral
College votes were allocated on some other basis.
Clamoring for national candidates' attention, almost every
state ends up with a winner-take-all allocation.
What may be rational at the state level, however,
can lead to distortions at the national level.94 The winner-
take-all effect ensures that small swings in state-vote
margins can disproportionately influence the national
Electoral College count. In a close election, such swings
can even determine the winner. The extreme case is the
2000 presidential election, where 537 popular votes in
Florida represented the difference in awarding the state's
92 U.S.CONST. amend. XII.
93id.
9" An analogue is the states' competition for "pork-barrel" spending in
the United States Congress. Each state's congressional delegation
serves as an advocate for that state's spending priorities. To the extent
that they are successful, they boost the size of the federal budget.
Either taxes must be raised or deficits must accrue to finance the added
spending.
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twenty-five Electoral College votes, and, ultimately, the
election, to Bush over Gore. Four years later, in the
presidential election of 2004, the margin of victory for
Bush over Democrat John F. Kerry was the 119,000 votes
in Ohio that swung that state's twenty Electoral College
votes.95 In the presidential election of 1976, the margin of
victory for Democrat Jimmy Carter over Republican Gerald
Ford amounted to 175,000 votes in three critical states:
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Texas. 96  Nearly half of Carter's
297-240 Electoral College vote margin over Ford was
attributable to his winning Ohio.97  Carter won Ohio's
allotment of twenty-five Electoral College votes by a
margin of 11,116 popular votes.
98
Moreover, the winner-take-all effect holds
irrespective of the "plus-two" bonus. When each state's
electors are allocated on a winner-take-all basis, distortions
can arise. The "plus-two" bonus only serves to magnify the
effect of those distortions.
It is possible to quantify the magnitude of the
distortion that arises in each presidential election from the
winner-take-all allocation of each state's Electoral College
votes. The critical element is the number of swing votes-
the votes that represented the margin of victory for the
winning candidate. This is the number of votes that swing
a state to the winning candidate. 99 The rest of the votes for
each major-party candidate offset each other. Thus, the
95 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
2004 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2005).
96 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
1976 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1977).
97 Id. One of Ford's electors defected to vote for Ronald W. Reagan
when the Electoral College convened.
98 Id.
99 The swing votes have also been called "wasted votes." JAMES P.
LEVINE & DAVID W. ABBOTT, WRONG WINNER: THE COMING
DEBACLE IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 22-24 (1991); Lani Guinier,
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1606 (1993).
18
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 471
swing votes are the ones that are of particular interest.
The key to this analysis is to determine the relative
impact of each state's swing votes in an election. The
impact of each state's swing votes is calculated by dividing
the number of Electoral College votes at stake by the
popular vote margin of victory for the winning candidate.
Invariably, the margin of victory dwarfs the number of
Electoral College votes, and the resulting fraction is tiny.
For ease of interpretation, each state's fraction can be
normalized with respect to the middle-ranking state for that
election. The states can then be ranked in order of their
swing voters' Electoral College impact for each election.
Begin with the most recent presidential election,
which occurred in 2004. Recall that Bush defeated Kerry
by a 286-252 electoral vote margin, and by 3.5 million
popular votes. Table 1 presents the state-by-state Electoral
College swing-vote impact rankings, for the fifty states plus
the District of Columbia. The results are normalized with
respect to that election's middle-ranking state, Alaska
(AK).
Table 1: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 2004
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact Impact Impact
WI 18.57 AR 1.28 TN 0.69
N.M. 13.34 AZ 1.27 WY 0.68
IA 11.38 MO 1.21 S.C. 0.64
N.H. 9.57 CA 1.18 GA 0.60
NV 5.09 W.V. 1.14 MS 0.58
PA 3.61 VA 1.07 N.Y. 0.57
OH 3.21 VT 1.05 KY 0.49
HI 2.36 R.I. 1.02 IN 0.47
DE 2.32 AK 1.00 KS 0.44
OR 2.28 CT 0.96 TX 0.44
MI 2.25 IL 0.90 NE 0.44
MN 2.23 MD 0.81 AL 0.41
CO 1.84 S.D. 0.79 D.C. 0.40
FL 1.55 N.D. 0.77 ID 0.39
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N.J. 1.55 N.C. 0.77 MA 0.36
WA 1.38 MT 0.71 OK 0.34
ME 1.35 LA 0.70 UT 0.28
Wisconsin topped the list of states for the 2004
election. Its ten Electoral College votes were won by Kerry
by a margin of 11,813 popular votes. Its popular-vote
margin was smaller than that of any other state, relative to
the number of Electoral College votes at stake. Only New
Mexico (N.M.) and New Hampshire (N.H.) had smaller
popular-vote margins, and they both carried fewer Electoral
College votes. Alaska (AK) was the median state. Bush
won its three Electoral College votes by a margin of 65,812
popular votes. At the bottom of the list was Utah (UT). It
gave Bush its five Electoral College votes by a margin of
385,337 popular votes. Note the contrast between the top-
ranking state and the bottom-ranking state. The popular-
vote margin in Utah was over 30 times larger than that in
Wisconsin, yet it swung only half as many Electoral
College votes.
As the table shows, each swing vote in Wisconsin
carried 18.57 times the Electoral College impact of a swing
vote in Alaska. Each swing vote in Utah carried 0.28 times
the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Alaska.
Therefore, Wisconsin's swing votes packed sixty-six times
the punch of Utah's swing votes.
Next, consider the 2000 presidential election. Bush
won 271 electoral votes, while Gore only received 267
electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 500,000 votes.
Results for the presidential election of 2000 are presented
in Table 2.
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Table 2: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 2000
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact _ Impact Impact
FL 1115.40 MI 1.98 WY 0.82
N.M. 327.31 WA 1.90 KY 0.82
WI 46.17 DE 1.68 AK 0.81
IA 40.47 LA 1.59 R.I. 0.81
OR 24.79 HI 1.42 CT 0.75
N.H. 13.29 VA 1.41 MD 0.73
NV 4.44 CO 1.32 N.J. 0.71
MN 4.09 GA 1.03 OK 0.71
MO 3.35 CA 1.00 MT 0.70
TN 3.28 S.D. 1.00 KS 0.64
OH 3.05 MS 1.00 NE 0.59
W.V. 2.92 IL 0.93 TX 0.56
ME 2.87 N.D. 0.90 ID 0.48
PA 2.87 N.C. 0.90 D.C. 0.47
AR 2.69 S.C. 0.87 N.Y. 0.46
VT 2.46 AL 0.87 MA 0.39
AZ 1.99 IN 0.84 UT 0.38
As those who recall the election of 2000, and its
ensuing legal battles, it is not a surprise that Florida (FL)
occupies the top spot. Bush won Florida's twenty-five
Electoral College votes by the razor-thin margin of 537
popular votes. The median state was California (CA). The
state of California had fifty-four Electoral College votes in
2000, the most of any state, but it also had the largest
popular-vote margin-for Gore-of 1,293,774 popular
votes. 100 Relative to other states, California's popular vote
margin was not disproportionate given the number of
Electoral College votes at stake. Finishing last again was
Utah. Its five Electoral College votes went to Bush by a
margin of 312,043 popular votes. Id.
The implications of the state-by-state ranking are
100 California cast fifty-five Electoral College votes in the 2004
presidential election. STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2000 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2001).
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striking. A swing vote in Florida carried over one thousand
times the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in
California. A California swing vote, in turn, carried nearly
three times the Electoral College impact of a Utah swing
vote. Again, the explanation pertains to the winner-take-all
allocation of each state's electors. To the victor goes the
spoils-no matter how small the margin of victory. The
Florida-Utah comparison shows how great the disparities
can be. In the case of a large state with a razor-tight margin
versus a small state with a runaway victor, the disparities
can be huge. In Utah, one-fifth as many Electoral College
votes were at stake as in Florida; yet Utah's popular-vote
margin was almost 600 times that of Florida. As a result,
each of Florida's swing votes carried nearly 3,000 times the
Electoral College impact of a Utah swing vote. What was
already a close election came down to a mere 537 votes in
one state due to the winner-take-all allocation of each
state's electors.
Both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were
closer than average.' 0' Each election also featured a
notable third-party candidate-Ralph Nader. 1°2  Now
consider the presidential election of 1988, which was not a
cliffhanger and lacked a major third-party candidate to
siphon votes from the Republican and Democratic
candidates. 1°3  In 1988, Republican George H.W. Bush
101 In Electoral College terms, they were the two closest of the last
twelve presidential elections since the size of the Electoral College
increased to 538 electors when Alaska and Hawaii joined the union.
The last twelve elections saw the winning candidate receive an average
of 388 Electoral College votes.
102 Nader received 2.7% of the popular vote in 2000 and 0.4% in 2004,
but received no Electoral College votes in either election. STATISTICS
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2000 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 2001); STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2004 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2005).
103 The 1992 and 1996 elections saw Democrat William J. Clinton
prevail over Republicans George H.W. Bush and Robert J. Dole,
respectively, by comfortable Electoral College margins. Both elections
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defeated Democrat Michael S. Dukakis by an electoral-vote
margin of 426-112.1°4 Bush's popular-vote margin over
Dukakis was seven million votes. 10 5  No third-party
candidate received more than one percent of the vote.1
0 6
The state-by-state rankings for the 1988 presidential
election are provided in Table 3.
Table 3: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 1988
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact Impact Impact
VT 5.57 R.I. 1.34 TN 0.65
WA 5.35 N.D. 1.23 OK 0.65
IL 4.01 WY 1.20 N.J. 0.60
PA 3.78 CO 1.19 ID 0.60
MD 3.19 MI 1.10 N.C. 0.60
W.V. 3.08 MN 1.08 MS 0.57
N.M. 3.07 AK 1.02 NE 0.57
MT 2.96 IA 1.02 N.H. 0.54
S.C. 2.40 ME 1.00 S.C. 0.54
WI 2.20 MA 1.00 AL 0.54
N.Y. 2.15 LA 0.96 GA 0.52
CA 2.12 KY 0.93 AZ 0.45
MO 2.10 NV 0.87 IN 0.44
OR 1.98 KS 0.85 VA 0.42
HI 1.88 AR 0.81 D.C. 0.36
CT 1.73 OH 0.77 UT 0.36
DE 1.54 TX 0.67 FL 0.35
also saw a significant third-party challenge from H. Ross Perot, who
received 19% of the popular vote in 1992 and 8.4% in 1996. His
candidacy helped keep Clinton from receiving more than 50% of the
popular vote in either election. STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1992 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1993);
STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
1996 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1997).
'0 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
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The 1988 election demonstrates that even in an
election that was not a cliffhanger and lacked a major third-
party candidate, the winner-take-all allocation of Electoral
College votes can lead to distortions. In this case, Vermont
(VT) was positioned at the top of the list. In Vermont, a
popular-vote margin of 8,556 votes made the difference in
assigning the state's three Electoral College votes to
Dukakis. The middle state, and the one with respect to
which the others were normalized, was Maine (ME). Its
four Electoral College votes went to Dukakis, who won its
popular vote by a margin of 63,562 votes. Florida (FL)
held the last position. Although Florida had the smallest
popular-vote margin of any state in 2000, it had the largest
popular-vote margin in 1988. Its twenty-one Electoral
College votes were won by Bush based on a 962,184
popular-vote margin. 107
In the 1988 election, a swing vote in Vermont
carried 5.57 times the Electoral College impact of a swing
vote in Maine. It carried 16 times the impact of a swing
vote in Florida. The ratio of the top-to-bottom state was
smaller for the 1988 election than for either the 2000 or
2004 elections. Still, the existence of a disparity for the
1988 election, and a sizable one at that, reinforces the
finding that the winner-take-all allocation of Electoral
College votes gives some states' voters a greater influence
on an election's outcome than other states' voters.
Each presidential election is different; some are
landslides, while others are cliffhangers. Some display
more regional variation than others. Some feature
significant third-party challenges. Yet, each of these three
elections saw great variation across states in the magnitude
of a swing vote's Electoral College impact. An indicator of
the Electoral College disparity in each presidential election
is the ratio of a swing vote's Electoral College impact in
107 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
OF 1988 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1989).
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the top-ranked state to that of the bottom-ranked state.
Again, the top-ranked state is the state with the smallest
popular-vote margin relative to the number of Electoral
College votes at stake, and the bottom-ranked state is the
state with the largest relative popular-vote margin. In the
preceding tables, the ratios were calculated for the 1988,
2000, and 2004 elections. Table 4 presents the ratios for
every election dating back to 1960, the first presidential
election in which the current number of 538 Electoral
College votes were at stake.
Table 4: Top-Ranked State/Bottom-Ranked State Ratios, 1960-2004
Presidential Elections
Election Top-Ranked Bottom-Ranked EC Impact Ratio
State State
1960 HI MA 832
1964 AZ R.I. 63
1968 AR MA 71
1972 MN FL 7
1976 OH UT 88
1980 MA UT 288
1984 MN UT 209
1988 VT FL 16
1992 GA D.C. 54
1996 NV MA 59
2000 FL UT 2,905
2004 WI UT 65
The table demonstrates that sizable disparities have
been present in every presidential election since 1960. In
1960, a swing vote in Hawaii (HI), the state with the
smallest popular vote margin relative to its number of
Electoral College votes that year, carried 832 times the
Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Massachusetts
(MA), the largest-margin state. That election was a close
one, with Democrat John F. Kennedy prevailing over
Republican Richard M. Nixon by 303 to 219 in the
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Electoral College, and by 100,000 popular votes. 1° 8 The
election of 1972 was a landslide for Nixon over Democrat
George McGovern, when Nixon received 521 Electoral
College votes to McGovern's 17 and won 18 million more
popular votes. 10 9 That election saw a swing-vote impact
ratio of seven for the top-ranked state, Minnesota (MN), to
the bottom-ranked state, Florida (FL). Its ratio was the
smallest of any of the twelve elections since 1960. The
largest Electoral College landslide occurred in 1984, with
Republican Ronald W. Reagan prevailing over Democrat
Walter F. Mondale by an electoral count of 525 to 13.110
Reagan's popular-vote margin over Mondale was 16.9
million votes, slightlyX smaller than that of Nixon over
McGovern in 1972.1 In that election, the swing-vote
impact ratio of the highest state, Minnesota (MN), to the
lowest state, Utah (UT), was 209.
The Bush-Gore cliffhanger of 2000 was the outlier.
It exhibited, by far, the largest swing-vote ratio of any of
the last dozen elections. In that election, a swing-vote in
Florida carried 2,905 times the impact of a swing-vote in
Utah. The key was again the tiny margin in Florida, where
a mere 537 popular votes swung the state's twenty-five
Electoral College votes to Bush. Only two elections since
1960 saw smaller popular vote margins in any states-
Hawaii in 1960 and New Mexico in 2000. But, neither
108 Third-party candidate Harry F. Byrd received fifteen Electoral
College votes in Alabama and Virginia. STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1960 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1961).
109 McGovern won only the Electoral College votes of Massachusetts
(fourteen) and the District of Columbia (three). STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1972 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1973).
110 Mondale's thirteen Electoral College votes came from Minnesota
(ten) and the District of Columbia (three). STATISTICS OF THE
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state carried anywhere near the twenty-five Electoral
College votes that Florida had in 2000.112
In general, the closer elections saw larger disparities
and the landslide elections saw smaller disparities. The two
elections that saw the largest disparities, 1960 and 2000,
were close elections. The two elections that saw the
smallest disparities, 1972 and 1988, were landslides. The
explanation is that a close election is likely to see more
states decided by small margins than would be the case for
a landslide election. Close elections tend to have more
close states than landslide elections. Still, even a landslide
election can have some states decided by narrow margins,
like Minnesota in 1984.113 The key is the variation
between states. If the election victor's popular-vote margin
of victory was uniform across all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, then there would be no Electoral
College swing-vote disparity. In that case, the nation's
swing voters would be evenly distributed across the land.
A swing vote in one state would carry the same Electoral
College impact as a swing vote in another state.' 14 It is
when the distribution is uneven, and each state's Electoral
College votes are allocated on a winner-take-all basis, that
disparities arise. The uneven distribution means that small
shifts in some states' swing votes can swing
disproportionately large numbers of Electoral College votes
from one candidate to another.
As long as there is variation in candidate
preferences from one state to the next, the winner-take-all
allocation of Electoral College votes ensures that there will
"' In 1960, a margin of 115 popular votes swung Hawaii's then-three
Electoral College votes to Kennedy over Nixon. In 2000, a margin of
366 popular votes was the difference in awarding New Mexico's five
Electoral College votes to Gore over Bush.
113 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
OF 1984 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1985).
114 It would not be precisely the same, due to the "plus-two" bonus in
the distribution of electors among the states, but it would be very close.
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be disparities. Of course, state-by-state variations in
preference are inevitable in a large, diverse nation such as
the United States. In a pluralistic nation of 300 million
people scattered unevenly across fifty states, differences
will exist from one state to the next. In the most recent
election cycle, these differences have even spawned the
shorthand of "red states" versus "blue states." The "red
states" favor the Republicans, and the "blue states" favor
the Democrats. The state-by-state differences are a fixture
of the electoral landscape. Since they have persisted and
will continue to persist, the winner-take-all allocation of
Electoral College votes in presidential elections ensures
that there will continue to be disparities in the value of each
vote. These disparities have occurred in each of the last
twelve presidential elections and will continue to occur.
V. Constitutional Concerns About the Winner-
Take-All Allocation of Electors
Why are such disparities in the allocation of
Electoral College votes problematic? They are suspect
because of the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote"
rulings in Reynolds and its progeny. "One person, one
vote" does not really exist when one state's swing votes
carry tens or hundreds or even thousands of times as much
impact as another state's swing votes on a national
election's outcome. Clearly, it is inequitable, but is it
unconstitutional? To be able to articulate such a claim
before the courts, three hurdles would have to be
surmounted.
First, one would have to deal with the objection that
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that state
legislatures may direct how electors are selected. This
clause, especially as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
McPherson v. Blacker115 and Bush v. Gore,116 gives states
115 146 U.S. at 1.
28
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 481
plenary and almost absolute power to implement their
presidential vote. There are several responses to this first
objection.
What is being challenged is not the authority of
states to allocate electoral votes, which is clearly provided
for in the Constitution. Rather, the issue being challenged
is the winner-take-all method of allocating those votes. As
noted earlier, contrary to what the Court indicated in Bush
v. Gore117 and McPherson v. Blacker,118 the power of state
legislatures to allocate electoral votes is not unlimited.
Cases such as Anderson v. Celebrezze,119 Burroughs v.
United States,120 and Moore v. Ogilvie,121 illustrate the
Supreme Court's willingness to place some limits on the
processes state legislatures implement in running their
presidential elections, to draw limits on ballot access,
political corruption, and most directly, to select presidential
electors in conformity with the "one person, one vote"
reapportionment standard. 1
22
Second, even within Bush v. Gore, 123 the logic of
the majority opinion-that state legislatures cannot set up
an arbitrary process for the counting of votes-seems to
suggest limits on the power to select electors. Under the
holding of Bush v. Gore, it is doubtful that a state
legislature could enact a law indicating that in counting
ballots, total discretion to ascertain voter intent is left up to
election judges. Bush v. Gore stands for the claim that the
Equal Protection clause limits state legislatures in their
discretion to count votes.
116 531 U.S. at 98.
1171d.
118 146 U.S. at 1.
"9 460 U.S. at 780.
120290 U.S. at 534.
121 394 U.S. at 814.
122 See supra Section II.
123 531 U.S. at 98.
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Finally, as noted earlier, 124 it seems unlikely that a
state legislature could limit franchise rights in a presidential
election to only whites, and it also seems absurd to think
that it could state the same rule for determining who is
chosen as an elector. Overall, state legislatures may have
broad authority to select their electors, but contrary to what
Bush v. Gore and McPherson indicate, that power is not
really plenary and beyond question.
A related hurdle or objection to challenging the
winner-take-all method in court is to argue that if the
winner-take-all method of awarding Electoral College votes
is unconstitutional, it would follow that the equal allocation
of senators to big states and small states is also
unconstitutional. Here, one can respond by stating that the
equal allocation of senators to all states is provided for
under the Constitution, and the Court already ruled on that
issue in Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado. 1
25
In addition, some may argue that if one can
challenge the winner-take-all method of selecting
presidential electors as unconstitutional under the "one
person, one vote" standard, then why is the representational
schema of allocating two senators and at least one house
member to each state, regardless of population, not also
subjected to the same argument. Two responses are in
order. First, unlike the representational schema for the
House and Senate, which is constitutionally mandated and
clearly described in Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, the winner-take-all method is not
constitutionally mandated or specified in the text. Instead,
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, and the Twelfth
Amendment merely delegate to state legislatures the power
to select their electors without specifying a format.
126 127 128Second, in Reynolds, aer and Lucas, the Court
12 4 See supra Section H.
125 377 U.S. at 713.
126jd. at 571-76.
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discussed the relationship between state representation
schemes and the "federal analogy" to the Senate. In these
cases, the Court noted the historical differences between
state and federal representation, the purposes behind the
federal system, and why they are different. 129 In effect, the
Court rejected the analogies based upon constitutional text
and history. Similarly, if one were to challenge the Article
I, Sections 2 and 3 congressional representational plan as
violating the "one person, one vote" standard, the Court
would dismiss the claim because the text of the
Constitution provides for such a system.
A third objection or hurdle to address is that even if
one could show that state legislative authority to select
electors is not unlimited, a question still exists whether the
"one person, one vote" standard would apply. Would
challenging the allocation of electors be different from
simply questioning the constitutionality of the means by
which states are initially awarded electors?
Thus, a challenge to one method that a state
legislature uses to allocate electoral votes is not a challenge
either to their overall authority to determine a method or to
the constitutionally explicit language determining the size
of a state's total number of elector votes. Yet, in terms of
whether one could raise a "one person, one vote" challenge
to the winner-take-all method, a few responses are also
possible. First, the Court already ruled in Moore v. Ogilvie
that "one person, one vote" applied within the context of
selecting presidential candidates at the state level. '
30
Second, Delaware v. New York establishes neither a
precedent that review of presidential elector selection is
non-justiceable nor that the "one person, one vote" standard
does not apply. Instead, Delaware v. New York arose at a
127 369 U.S. at 302-07.
128 377 U.S. at 738.
129 462 U.S. at 738-9.
130 See supra notes 52 to 55 and accompanying text.
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time early in the reapportionment jurisprudence. Now,
nearly two generations later, one could argue in the same
way Bush v. Gore pushed this line of cases to apply to the
counting of votes, the same logic of "one person, one vote"
should extend to the winner-take-all method of allocating
electoral votes. After all, allocating votes, or assigning
them to a particular candidate, is essentially the same as the
counting of votes, or they are at least conceptually related.
Third, if winner-take-all systems create
disincentives for some to vote,' 3 ' especially if these non-
voters are in a racial minority, and a voter could show that
a state retained this type of electoral vote allocation system
for discriminatory reasons, one might be able to argue that
the right to vote is being diluted in ways no different than
in situations found in the early reapportionment cases of the
1960s.1 
32
Finally, if the courts still do not wish to address the
constitutionality of winner-take-all systems, is the matter
dead? Not necessarily. States could on their own change
their own systems. The argument here is that winner-take-
all systems effectively either disenfranchise some of their
own cities vis-a-vis others within the state, or that such a
system contributes to a practice across forty-eight states
that hurts their own citizens' influence in the selection of
the President.
On balance, winner-take-all systems for the
allocation of presidential electors raise serious
constitutional questions that the courts should address.
Winner-take-all systems weigh votes differently. Some
voters' decisions end up counting much more toward the
outcome of a presidential election than votes of other
people under winner-take-all. Such systems would, thus,
seem to violate the "one person, one vote" standard that the
Court has held to govern the allocation and exercise of the
13' See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
'32 See supra Section III.
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franchise.
IV. Conclusion
The Electoral College was instituted as a
presidential selection system to give small states more
political influence and to offset regional factionalism that
might occur if the Chief Executive were selected by
popular vote. The Constitution permits state legislatures to
award electors in the manner of their own choosing. The
winner-take-all method that forty-eight states currently use
to select their electors evolved largely as a way to help
states maximize their influence in presidential elections.
Yet, such a system unfairly weighs the preferences of some
voters more than others. This violates the one-person, one-
vote standard articulated in Reynolds v. Sims, 133 and
subsequently applied to aspects of presidential contests
such as in Moore v. Ogilvie 1 and Bush v. Gore.1
3 5
Despite claims that the state power over selection of
presidential electors is absolute, case law suggests the
contrary. Instead, claims contesting the constitutionality of
some forms of state allocation of electoral votes should be
entertained by the courts, or at least by legislatures. While
the Court in Delaware v. New York was unwilling to
adjudicate "one person, one vote" claims in the context of
how electors are selected, subsequent maturity of the
reapportionment and right to vote case law, as well as the
continuing debate over what happened in Florida in the
presidential election of 2000, make it ripe to revisit this
issue, either judicially or in the alternative, in the state
legislatures.
133 377 U.S. at 533.
134 394 U.S. at 814.
135 531 U.S. at 98.
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